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Comments
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw-LANDFILL Pmunv'r REQU MEENTS-THE CoRPs
OF ENGINEERS DOES AN ABOUT FAcE.-Plaintiffs Zabel and Russell
owned eleven acres of tideland on Boca-Ciega Bay in the St. Peters-
burg-Tampa, Florida area which they desired to fill and use for
commercial purposes. Their plans were opposed by state and local
agencies' on. ecological grounds, but state judicial approval was
eventually granted.2 Plaintiffs then applied to the Army Corps of
Engineers for a federal dredging and filling permit in accordance
with the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.3 The Corps
of Engineers concluded that the fill would not interfere with naviga-
tion, but refused the permit on the basis of evidence that unavoid-
able ecological damage to the bay's marine life would ensue. Plaintiffs
initiated this suit contending that their fill would not hinder navigation
and that the United States, under the Submerged Lands Act,4 had
relinquished its authority to regulate tidelands for any purposes
except navigation, flood control, and power production. They further
alleged that the Corps of Engineers and its superior, the Secretary
of the Army, was without authority to deny their permit on other
grounds. A federal district court granted summary judgment for
plaintiffs with an order to the Secretary of the Army to issue the
permit.5 Defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit. Held: Reversed. The Secretary of the Army is
authorized to deny, on ecological grounds, a permit to dredge and
fill privately owned tidelands even though the fill will not interfere
with navigation. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
Since the turn of the century the United States has achieved
fantastic technological progress. We are just beginning to realize
how dear the price of progress is and will continue to be. Water
pollution alone is going to cost an estimated 24 to 26 billion dollars
over the next five years.6 The cost is high but at least there is hope
when a resource is reclaimable. The real tragedy occurs when a
I Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, Board of County
Commissioners of Pinellas County, the County Health Board of Pinellas County,
the Florida Board of Conservation.2 Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Authority, 154 So. 2d
181 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1963), rev'd, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
333 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
443 U.S.C. § 1311 (1964).
5 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).6 Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress,
68 Micn. L. RPv. 1073 (1970).
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resource is irrevocably lost. As of 1965 the United States had lost
over seven per cent, some 750,000 acres, of its total estuarine areas
to small dredge and fill operations.7 Florida has lost almost 10 per
cent of its shoreline and Californa has suffered a staggering 67 per
cent loss.8 This continued loss of estuaries is ruining the habitat of
many of our most valuable food and game fishes. The result is a
continually decreasing commercial fishery with the accompanying
financial hardship to all those who are dependent on it. The aesthetic
loss, the difference between an undisturbed shoreline and a high-rise
building, is more difficult to measure.
Zabel has shown us that there are far-reaching means at the
government's disposal to protect our natural resources. It is squarely
up to the governmental agencies, such as the Corps of Engineers, to
see that these means are utilized and that the environment is given
equal consideration along with other factors when water resource
projects are planned.
The Corps of Engineers has primary authority for approval of
any construction in the nation's navigable waters. This authority is
derived from the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899,
which makes dredging and filling in navigable waters illegal unless
first recommended by the Corps and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army.9 The "unless" is the crux of the problem. The Corps may
grant or deny a request on some conditions, but these conditions
are not specified in the Act. Historically, most disputes have arisen
in terms of navigation problems.10 But, in United States ex rel.
7 Hearings on Permit for Landfill in Hunting Creek, Va. Before a Subcom.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
56 (1969).
8 id.
9 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964) provides:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress,
to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is
prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building
of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or
other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable
river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor
lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary
of the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity
of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge or
inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the channel of any
navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been recom-
mended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army prior to beginning the same.
1OUnited States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Wisconsin
v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405
(1925).
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Greathouse v. Dern,n the Supreme Court, for economic reasons, took
a different view. There petitioners sought a permit to build a wharf
extending into the Potomac River. The Secretary of War specifically
found that the wharf presented no navigational hazard, but denied
the permit because the United States planned to build a parkway
in the immediate area and petitioner's land would be condemmed
to provide access to it. Thus, to allow construction of the wharf
would have increased the cost of the land to the government in the
future. The decision indicates that there are circumstances in which
factors other than navigation may determine whether a permit is
issued.
In Citizens Committee v. Volpe,12 the Corps' approval was re-
quested and granted for a huge landfill which would be connected
to, though not be a part of, a causeway. The project would include
9,500,000 cubic yards of fill at a cost of millions of dollars. The state
still required the approval of the Secretary of Transportation to
construct the causeway as provided in the Department of Transporta-
tion Act.13 The Secretary, in turn, was required by the Act to consider
any resultant environmental damage of projects approved by him.14
Therefore if the fill were completed, any potential environmental
damage would be done and the Corps would have effectively
rendered the Secretary's decision moot. The court said:
In view of this congressional [environmental] intent encompassed
in the Department of Transportation Act we hold that the Corps
of Engineers exceeded its statutory authority in ignoring the
presence of the causeway when it issued the permit without prior
approval of the Secretary of Transportation. 15
The theme of these cases indicates that the Corps is not and
should not be restricted to questions of navigation. This view was
taken by Congress in 1958 when it amended the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act [hereinafter Wildlife Act]. 16 It begins by stating
that national policy includes:
... recognizing the vital contribution of our wildlife resources to
the Nation, the increasing public interest and significance thereof
due to expansion of our national economy and other factors,
and . .. that wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration
11289 U.S. 352 (1983).
12 802 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
1349 U.S.C. § 1655(g) (Supp. V, 1970).
1449 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. V, 1970).
15 Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
1616 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c. (1964).
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and be coordinated with other features of water-resource develop-
ment programs .... 17 (Emphasis added.)
In order to implement this policy, section 662(a)18 directs that
before any proposed water-resource project is undertaken "any
department or agency" planning the work must consult with the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service and related state agencies
with a view not only to conserve wildlife resources, but to develop
and improve them. While the Wildlife Act specifies "any department
or agency," a portion of the legislative history is so specific as to
the agency and type of project involved as to be on all fours with
Zabel:
Finally, the nursery and feeding grounds of valuable crustaceans,
such as shrimp, as well as the young of valuable marine fishes,
may be affected by dredging, filling, and diking operations often
carried out to improve navigation and provide new industrial or
residential land.
Existing law has questionable application to projects of the
Corps of Engineers for the dredging of bays and estuaries for
navigation and filling purposes. More seriously, existing law has
no application whatsoever to the dredging and filling of bays
and estuaries by private interests or other non-Federal entities in
navigable waters under permit from the Corps of Engineers. This
is a particularly serious deficiency from the standpoint of com-
mercial fishing interests. The dredging of these bays and estuaries
along the coastlines to aid navigation and also to provide land
fills for real estate and similar developments, both by Federal
agencies or other agencies under permit from the Corps of
Engineers, has increased tremendously in the last 5 years. Ob-
viously, dredging activity of this sort has a profound disturbing
effect on aquatic life, including shrimp and other species of
tremendous significance to the commercial fishing industry. The
bays, estuaries, and related marsh areas are highly important as
17 16 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
18 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1964) states:
Except as hereafter stated in subsection (h) of this section, whenever
the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed or autho-
rized to be impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream
or other body of water otherwise controlled or modified for any purpose
whatever, including navigation and drainage, by any department or
agency of the United States, or by any public or private agency under
Federal permit or license, such department or agency first shall consult
with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the
Interior, and with the head of the agency exercising administration over
the wildlife resources of the particular State wherein the impoundment,
diversion, or other control facility is to be constructed, with a view to
the conservation of wildlife resources by preventing loss of and damage
to such resources as well as providing for the development and improve-
ment thereof in connection with such water-resource development.
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spawning and nursery grounds for many commercial species of
fish and shellfish.19
There is no doubt that Congress is vitally concerned about the
cumulative effect of many small dredging projects such as the one
proposed by the plaintiffs. By providing for consultation between
the Corps and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, it intended
to prevent this type of dredge and fill project in this location.
Another significant event occurred in 1967 when the Department
of the Army and the Department of Interior issued a "Memorandum
of Understanding"" in recognition of their joint responsibilities
regarding water-resource projects. They pledged to resolve any
differences "at the earliest practicable time" and at the organizational
level most directly concerned. Most important is that the Secretary
of the Army, after being advised that the project will have adverse
ecological effects "will carefully evaluate the advantages and benefits
of the operations in relation to the resultant loss or damage .. .
and will either deny the permit or include such conditions . . . as
he determines to be in the public interest .... 21 Pursuant to the
Memorandum of Understanding, the Corps in 1968 revised its permit
requirements2 2 to include an evaluation of "all relevant factors"23
when considering an application. Among those factors enumerated
were fish and wildlife, pollution and ecology. The Corps also
incorporated in its regulations,24 almost verbatim, section 662(a)25
of the Wildlife Act.
Congress' most recent mandate, the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,26 [hereinafter Policy Act] is direct and incisive. The
purpose of the Policy Act is to "encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment."27 This harmony is to
be achieved by a coordination, among all agencies, of their respective
projects and by interpreting all existing federal law in such a manner
as to enhance the environment.
The Fifth Circuit in Zabel noted that the question presented,
whether the Corps of Engineers could deny a permit on ecological
19 S. REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), cited in Zabel v. Tabb,
430 F.2d at 210.
2033 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(11) (1968).
21 Id. (emphasis added)
2233 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1968).
23 For an interesting discussion of what constitutes a "relevant factor" see
Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 612, 631 (1970).
24 33 C.F.R. 290.120(d)(5) (1968).
25 See note 18 supra.
2642 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (1969).
2742 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1969).
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grounds, was one of first impression. It reviewed the basis of the
Corps' authority, the Rivers and Harbors Act, and like the Supreme
Court, construed it "charitably in light of the purpose to be served"
and not with "a narrow, cramped reading."28 Though cognizant of the
Act's concern with navigation and its historical interpretation in that
light, the court did not believe so restricted a view necessary. It cited
Greathouse as authority for the proposition "that the Corps of Engi-
neers does not have to wear navigational blinders when it considers
a permit request. That there must be a reason [to deny a permit] does
not mean that the reason has to be navigability."29
Any doubt the court may have had about the correctness of the
Corps' posture in this instance was negated by the reading it gave the
Wildlife Act. The court reasoned that in light of Congress' environ-
mental concern it would be ludicrous not to expect cooperation from
the only agency authorized to license dredging operations. The
pointedness of the Act's legislative history foreclosed any further de-
bate in the court's mind. Consideration of the Memorandum of
Understanding and the Policy Act solidified the court's decision.30
The court knew that this suit had been initiated prior to either of
the latter two documents and herein would seem to lie its emphasis
on the Wildlife Act. The inference seems to be that it wanted the
parties to be aware that the same decision could have been reached
then as now. To further that awareness it cited a 1967 decision al
which quoted with approval the consultation provision, section 662(a),
of the Wildlife Act. The court concluded that when the Rivers and
Harbors Act, the Wildlife Act, the Memorandum of Understanding
and the Policy Act were read in pari materia the inescapable conclusion
was that of a national policy of environmental conservation and
preservation. The Secretary of the Army, on recommendation from
the Chief of Engineers, still has the final word, but only after con-
sultation with other agencies. If he rejects an application on ecological
grounds he is acting under congressional authority to do so.
The decision in Zabel is genuinely important, both for its con-
temporary relevance and its adherence to congressional command.
Congress declared and the court confirmed that our environment is
far too valuable to be carelessly despoiled. The court's discussion of
the importance of our environment underscores the need for constant
vigilance in guarding against further desecration. That the court did
not exhort the public to watchfulness, however, is disappointing, for
28 United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960).
29 430 F.2d at 208.
30 430 F.2d at 210, 213.31 Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 443-44 (1967).
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a careful consideration of the facts reveals that local opposition to
the project was more instrumental in the Corps' decision than the
environmental question standing alone.
The court noted that the question presented was novel. The next
question obviously is, "Why?" This question admits of two possible
answers. Either this is the first time the Corps of Engineers has denied
a permit on ecological grounds, or else it is the first time such a denial
has been challenged. The latter is highly unlikely in view of the
Corps' history of wearing "navigational blinders" and the economic
concern of land developers. The former is given impetus by section
209.120(d) (1) of the Corps' own regulations, effective December 18,
1968. The date is important because this section not only specifies the
requirements for a permit, but further states that in the event of local
opposition to a project the permit will usually be denied.32 This
regulation effectively codifies the history of this litigation and indicates
that opposition to a permit is often as important in reaching a
decision as any potential ecological damage.33 Thus we have a novel
question because this is the first time a denial has been issued on an
ecological basis.
This is extremely important because the court grounded its decision
primarily on section 662(a) of the Wildlife Act which has required
consultation between governmental agencies on this type of project
since 1958. If the Corps has since then conscientiously adhered to the
provisions of this Act, it seems incredible that the question before the
court was not litigated years ago. Consider also that this particular
project is not unique. As indicated by the statistics cited earlier,34
these small projects have been occurring continuously for many
years. This focuses attention on what seems to be the underlying
issue, i.e. why the Corps denied the permit for this project and not for
similar past projects. Admittedly the court may have had to go some-
what beyond what was necessary to its decision to reach this issue.
32 In a section concerned with general policies on issuing permits the reg-
ulations state:
In cases where the structure is unobjectionable but when State or local
authorities decline to give their consent to the work, it is not usual for
the Corps of Engineers to issue a permit. It practically becomes of no
value in the event of opposition by State or local Authority. In such
cases the applicant is informed that the structure is unobjectionable and
that the permit would be issued were the consent of the local authority
also forthcoming. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1968).3 3 A dramatic example of public o position to a Corps project, the Cross-
Florida Barge Canal, which culminated in the President personally cancelling
the project for environmental preservation is reported by Funk, One Woma.s
Angry Campaign Halted the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, The Lexington (Ken-
tacky) Herald, January 25, 1971, § 2, at 18, col. 1.
34 See note 7 supra.
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But there are instances in which merely interpreting the law does not
dispose of the entire issue. The availability of law to a party is not al-
ways enough. There must be a real desire to use it, both in letter and
spirit. Therein lies the minor flaw in this opinion. The court acknow-
ledges the authority of the Corps of Engineers to deny a permit for
environmental protection, but is silent as to the Corps' obligation to
use this authority even when, as here, it is apparent that public
agencies and individuals have had to force it to act.
The public has a vested interest in knowing how well its environ-
ment is being protected. If public pressure is occasionally needed
that fact should be stated, for the the court has information before it
which the public does not. People are becoming more aware of how
important their environment is to them. The right to a livable en-
vironment has become of paramount importance and has been termed
perhaps the most fundamental of all rights.5 5 The reason is simply
that a breach of an environmental right, like transforming a shore
into a landfill, is often irrevocable. This is too high a price to pay for
public unawareness. The court cannot be so ingenuous as to believe
that all governmental agencies now see the light of law and reason
and need no further public supervision.3 6
Lee M. MacCracken
LABOR BELAnoNs-§ 301(a) LABoR-MANAGEENT BELATONS Acr
AND Nomus-LAGuADA Acr-CoucnvE BmARA NG AGEEmmms-
No-STR= CLAusE.-A supervisor employed by petitioner Boys Mark-
ets Incorporated, with the aid of other non-union personnel, rear-
ranged various items of merchandise in the frozen foods compartments
at one of petitioner's stores. A union representative thereupon de-
manded the food cases be stripped of all merchandise and be refilled
by members of respondent union local 770. When petitioner refused
to comply with this demand, a strike was called by local 770 in
violation of an arbitration agreement with petitioner that required
35 See Sive, supra note 23, at 643.36 See L. JAFFE, JuDICAL CONTROL OF ADMIiISTuATION AcrIoN 580 (1965).
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